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"By superficial and purposive interpretations of the past, the Court has
dishonored the arts of the historian and degraded the talents of the lawyer."'
Thus did Mark DeWolfe Howe - generally renowned for his graciousness
- begin his famous series of lectures reviewing the United States Supreme
Court's treatment of the social and intellectual history of church and state. The
Court's decisions since the 1965 publication of The Garden and the Wilder-
ness make Howe's critique seem understated.
Despite a flood of illuminating and directly relevant scholarship about
religion in the last decade,2 the Supreme Court now has inserted significant
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' MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 4 (1965).
2 See, e.g., ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES (1990);
BETrE NOVIT EVANS, INTERPRETING THE FREE ExERCISE OFRELIGION: THE CONSTITUTION AND
AMERICAN PLURALISM (1997); JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1997); THE
VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds.,
1988); NANCY ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USE OF PLURALISM
IN AMERICA (1998); Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH.
L. REv. 477 (1991); Philip Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An
Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 915 (1992) [hereinafter Hamburger,
Constitutional Right]; Philip Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century
Debate About Equal Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SuP. CT. REV. 295 (1992)
[hereinafter Hamburger, Equality and Diversity]; Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the
Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1106 (1994); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990); Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: the
Problem of Burden on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1988); Michael
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new ahistorical "synthetic strands into the tapestry of American history."3 The
interplay of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith4
and City of Boerne v. Flores,' for example, suggests a current Court majority
that disregards not only history in general, but also in particular, as well as the
Court's own precedents and the usual demands of internal consistency.
After a majority of the Justices relegated religious freedom claims to the
majoritarian political process in Smith, the Court in Boerne invalidated one of
the clear products of that process - the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
passed after extensive hearings by a nearly-unanimous Congress. The Court
acted in the name of abstract versions of separation of powers and federalism.
As in other recent opinions about religion, the Court in Smith and Boerne
relied on tub-thumping about its responsibility in guarding constitutional turf,
a key component within the Court's proclaimed role as guarantor of neutral
laws of general application. Instead of close consideration of particular
disputes in the context of living communities, the Court has adopted a
breathtakingly broad New Formalism. With a few possible exceptions,6 the
fundamental premise of the SmithlBoerne approach is that religious matters
may be left to majoritarian political processes, but only at the state level.
Critical to this New Formalism maneuver is concern with jurisdiction, an
abstract construct that is used and abused most comfortably by those with legal
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV.
L. REv. 1409 (1990); David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionism and Religious
Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (1991).
3 HowE, supra note 1, at 4.
4 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (stating that Oregon need not demonstrate compelling state interest
to deny unemployment benefits to members of Native American Church for use of peyote in
religious ceremony). I should mention that I co-authored an amicus curiae brief for the
American Civil Liberties Union before the Supreme Court in this case.
' 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991, in which
Congress attempted to return to pre-Smith requirement that government demonstrate compelling
state interest and narrowly tailored regulation to overcome legitimate Free Exercise Clause
claim).
6 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(invalidating local "religious gerrymander" banning ritual animal sacrifice as violation of
"fundamental nonpersecution principle" of First Amendment). To meet the test announced in
Lukumi, however, there must be convincing proof of an overt governmental effort to "infringe
upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation." Id. at 533. The Smith decision
leaves a further possible future opening for governmental intrusions impinging upon what the
Court might consider "hybrid" constitutional rights, i.e., rights that combine, for example,
freedom of expression with free exercise. If this judicial innovation is unduly complicated and
formalistic, it is also not at all convincing as a way to distinguish key precedents such as West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), and Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972), from Smith. Ironically, the Court's sweeping proclamations in Boerne
seem, in turn, to be anchored largely on defensiveness about the brave new constitutional world
proclaimed in Smith.
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training. Decisions couched as questions of jurisdiction allow judges to claim
that they are the exclusive gatekeepers, patrolling essential binary choices
between the states and the federal government and among the separate
branches of the federal government. Neither the lower federal courts nor
Congress may continue to require that state and local authorities justify general
intrusions on religious freedom, so long as any such limitations are unintended
or not aimed specifically at religious belief and conduct.
In the name of the basics of constitutionalism, judges now purport to
maintain a different kind of wall of separation, a Great Wall high above the
messy intricacies of daily life. Our marblecake of federalism - a mishmash of
intersecting federal, state, and local powers and the intricate crisscrossing by
private individuals with multiple memberships, loyalties, and moral commit-
ment - can hardly be discerned from the judicial watch post high atop the
Great Wall. This Great Wall eventually may separate nothing lasting, and it
could well become the functional legal equivalent of a tourist attraction. For
the moment, however, the new Great Wall casts a giant shadow in constitu-
tional law.
To be sure, the very complexity of contemporary life underscores how
important it is for some legal order amid the chaos, and for what at least appear
to be final decisions about vexing conflicts.' Moreover, any formal legal
system - and for that matter any regimen of norms, customs, and usages
whether formal or not - must rely upon jurisdictional assumptions at or near
its foundation.9 Just as most modern lives involve shifting and repeatedly
negotiated boundaries of loyalty, membership, and kinship, however, most
legal disputes occur in the shadow of at least several different normative
sources.
' Morton Grodzins apparently first offered the image of American federalism as a "chaotic
marble cake" in response to cleaner, less realistic "layer cake" metaphors. See Morton
Grodzins, Centralization and Decentralization in the American System, in A NATION OF STATES:
ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 1, 4 (R. Goldwin ed., 1963).
8 This helps explain what was particularly noteworthy about the Court's innovative use of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)(5) inAgostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997),
as it overruled several Establishment Clause decisions about aid to sectarian schools for
remedial programs. TheAgostini majority held that under that Rule, which is couched in terms
of relief from a decision "no longer equitable," parties challenging a Supreme Court precedent
were entitled to relief from a District Court injunction on the grounds that the precedent might
be and should be overruled. See id.
' The biblical command, "You shall not displace your neighbor's boundary-marks which
your forerunners have set up," nicely illustrates the concern, for example, as well as some of
the basic conservatism of customary legal systems. Deuteronomy 19:14. As the Hellenist
commentator Philo explained, "For customs are unwritten laws, the decisions approved by men
of old, not inscribed on monuments nor on leaves of paper which the moth destroys, but on the
souls of those who are partners in the same citizenship." JAMES L. KUGEL, THE BIBLE AS IT
WAS 512 (1997).
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We have traveled a great distance from vigilance concerning "a gap in the
hedge or wall of separation between the garden of the church and the
wilderness of the world."'" Indeed, there have been numerous recent attacks
upon the very metaphor of a wall of separation, now generally attributed to
Thomas Jefferson without acknowledgment of its earlier appearance in the
radical religious thought of Roger Williams. It has become almost a standard
trope to pin Jefferson to the "wall of separation" and then to proclaim, for
example: "[i]t is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a
mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the
Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading
metaphor for nearly 40 years.""
I. TENDING ONE'S GARDEN: "FULL AND EQUAL RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE"
The Court's lack of concern for the fragility of both hedges and walls
protecting full freedom of conscience suggests a pressing commitment to
assert the Court's own homogenizing authority. At such a time, Candide's
famous advice to withdraw and to tend one's own garden 2 is enticing, but
dangerous. Instead of quiet acceptance of the New Formalism, at least for the
time being, it is worth pondering Mark DeWolfe Howe's clear warning: "the
importance of the Court's work lies not merely in the results of its delibera-
tions but in the processes by which it reaches them. The complexities of
history deserve our respect."' 3
What is most striking about the New Formalism is how rigidly statist the
current Court turns out to be. This Court is fundamentally statist in a double
sense: in its willingness to defer to government decision-makers generally over
claims anchored in religious beliefs, 4 and in its enthusiastic embrace of the
10 Roger Williams, Mr. Cotton's Letter Lately Printed, Examined andAnswered, in PERRY
MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: His CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN TRADITION 89, 98
(Atheneum 1953) (reprint 1970) (1644).
" Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Then-Justice
Rehnquist's choice of a 40-year timeframe is somewhat curious. Clearly, however, he very
much dislikes the results of decisions during these 40 years, particularly given that his opening
quote of the "wall of separation" metaphor is from Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879),
a case more than a century old. To Rehnquist, Jefferson "would seem to any detached observer
as a less than ideal source of contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment." Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91-92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). We will return
to the role of Jefferson and James Madison, and the issue of detached observers, shortly.
12 See VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE 120 (Lowell Bair, trans., Bantam Books 1959).
13 HOWE, supra note 1, at 174, 176.
'4 The Court emphasized and relied upon what it termed "internal government matters" in
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Association, 485 U.S. 439,448 (1988), and Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986). For a powerful critique, see Williams & Williams, supra note
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power of states qua states to regulate and even to penalize religious action and
belief. What is even more startling, however, is how often the Court's recent
decisions seek to chop through the Gordian knots of Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause interpretation. Sweeping initial premises and simplified
binary choices now dominate. These decisions are hardly true to text,
precedent, history, or even logic, but the demands of the perceived metes and
bounds of formal neutrality rule the day.
This essay does not claim that we are firmly bound by the Framers' original
intent, even were we able to discern it. This is so whether or not those present
at the creation - whenever that was and whoever they were - intended to bind
the future with their words or intentions. 5 Instead, by briefly examining a
largely overlooked strand of intellectual and social history concerning a
guarantee of full rights that directly connects texts surrounding the First
Amendment to texts surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment, I seek to
illustrate how the formal neutrality desperately sought by the current Court
begins to seem much more the problem than part of the solution to legal
controversies about religion.
Attention to historical nuances emphasizes the importance of multiple
perspectives and the need for sensitivity to different contexts within the realm
of freedom of conscience. The approach taken in this essay is quite different
from the current fad for pronunciamentoes - in the name of neutrality,
detachment, and objectivity - that now dominate judicial discourse. Stories
of origins have great significance in any society and, for that matter, for
individuals and families, too.' 6 Rather than ignoring such elemental accounts,
I suggest that we should attend to them and their histories with care. This
15 See, e.g., JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 3-34,339-68 (1996); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885 (1984). It may be relevant that, at the time of the
American Revolution, church membership and even church attendance in the United States was
remarkably low. Tom Paine was a runaway best-selling author - despite or perhaps in part
because of his scathing attacks on religion, and the population of non-Protestants was
infinitesimal - 25,000 Roman Catholics and 2,000 Jews - within a white population beginning
to approach 3 million people. See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNs, THE VINEYARD OF LBERTY 7
(1982). As Bums put it, "From the start the colonies had been alive with religious
controversies, doctrinal disputes, sectarian splits and secessions, revivalism and evangelism, the
importation of new creeds and dogmas from Europe, along with their carriers - alive also with
rationalist, deist, and atheistic counterattacks on religion." Id. at 8. Much changed, of course,
by the end of the Civil War, yet our filiopietistic approach to "the Framers" has all but blinded
us to fundamental changes not only in the structure and relationships within the constitutional
document, but within society. See CHARLESL. BLACK, JR.,ANEwBIRTH OFFREEDOM (1997);
CHARLES MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OFHISTORY (Simon and Schuster 1972)
(1969).
16 Such stories are "how one generation tells another how the future shapes the present out
of the past." MINER BALL, CALLED BY STORIES 6 (2000) (quoting Paul Lehmann).
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different historical vector contrasts sharply with the current Court's freeze-
dried version of Framers' intent.
If we were to grapple with early commitments to "freely and fullye have and
enjoy his and their owne judgments and consciences, in matters of religious
concernment,"' 7 for example, or if Madison's proposed guarantee of "full and
equal rights of conscience"' 8 were to be taken seriously, it would be much
more difficult to propagate the New Formalism's intransigent commitment to
statism. Instead, we would have to consider specific cases in context while
heeding the perspectives of those whose beliefs and actions are protected by
the Free Exercise Clause; particularly because, in the words of Justice Jackson,
"freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would
be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as
to things that touch the heart of the existing order."' 9 Let me explain.
II. BURDENS AND HISTORY: "THE DUNG HEAPE OF THIS EARTH' 2
0
A. Origins
Roger Williams was extraordinary. A generation ago, Williams's role as the
founder of Rhode Island who led the little colony to unprecedented toleration
for religious dissent seemed quite significant, and Howe, Perry Miller, and
Edmund S. Morgan provided accessible detail about Williams's ideas and
actions. Yet today, hardly anyone seems to know or care that Williams
actually forged toleration out of his deep religiosity and his unyielding belief
in predestination.
Massachusetts Bay Colony, populated largely by Puritan dissenters, actually
went further than had any other government in the western world in separating
church and state, yet Roger Williams's brand of separatism proved too radical
'7 Office of the Rhode Island Secretary of State, RHODE ISLAND CHARTER OF 1663, 1996.
IS 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 486 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1789) (Madison's proposal for what
became the First Amendment). There are two printings of the first two volumes of the Annals
of Congress. This article cites to the 1834 "Gales & Seaton" edition.
'9 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
20 EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE PURITAN DILEMMA 130 (1958). When John Winthrop urged
Roger Williams to consider whether everyone else could be wrong except Williams himself as
Williams pursued the logic of his separatist beliefs, Williams urged Winthrop to join him in
splendid isolation: "[A]bstract yourself with a holy violence from the Dung heape of this earth."
Id. Williams's views on the need for purity in the Church had become quite extreme. It was
at this point that Williams "having, a little before, refused communion with all, save his own
wife," according to Winthrop, decided that "now he would preach to and pray with all comers."
Id at 131.
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for Massachusetts. Williams was banished and headed south in the dead of
winter, 1635-36.2"
It was indeed a radical move for Williams to assert that the link between
church and state had been improper from the start and was a grave disservice
to Christ. When Constantine adopted Christianity, Williams argued, "then
began the great Mysterie of the Churches sleepe, the Gardens of Christs
Churches turned into the Wildernesse of Nationall Religion, and the World
(under Constantines Dominion) to the most unchristian Christendome. '22 To
Williams, God's true religion could and would take care of itself. It should not
be defended with anything but spiritual weapons.
"By accepting the alleged help of the temporal sword," Williams believed,
"a church proclaimed itself false."23 In following his radical ideas about the
role of Christ to their logical conclusions, Williams severed not only the
connection between God and the established Church, but also the nexus
between God and secular government. The theory of the divine right of kings
that James I developed during Williams's lifetime partially as a bulwark
against Roman Catholic hierarchical claims was but a logical extension of the
overlapping authority of church and state that permeated English life.
Williams liked to cite his own banishment from Massachusetts to emphasize
the wrongheadedness of any such use of secular power for sectarian ends.
Given Williams's own experiences, together with the developing role of
Rhode Island as a haven for dissenters, it is hardly surprising that when the
colony finally procured a royal charter from Charles H, protection for both
'"free" and 'fuilr' enjoyment of judgment and conscience - individual and
collective - had become a central concern. The 1663 Charter, which had been
obtained primarily through the efforts of the Baptist Dr. John Clarke, to assure
"full liberty, in religious concernments," even trumped contrary law, custom,
or usage, at least to the point that the exercise of free and full liberty of
conscience might interfere with public peace or cause civil injury or distur-
bance to others.24 The Charter thus formalized Williams's evocation of a long-
2 Edmund S. Morgan offers an admirably clear and succinct account of the complicated
series of confrontations between Massachusetts Bay governmental and religious authorities.
Id. at 115-33.
22 EDMUND S. MORGAN, ROGER WIHLIAMS: THE CHURCH AND THE STATE 96 (1967)
(quoting Roger Williams).
23 Id. at 98. Thus, Williams anticipated Kathleen Sullivan's position that on current church-
state issues "[w]e should have more faith in faith." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal
Democracy, 59 U. CHi. L. REv. 195, 223 (1992).
24 From the Rhode Island Charter:
[T]hat noe person within the colonie, at any time hereafter shall be in any wise molested,
punished, disquieted or called in question for any differences in opinions in matters of
religion.., but may from time to time, and at all times here after, freelye and fullye have
and engage in his and their own judgments and consciences, in matters of religious
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standing Christian tradition that differentiated between two tables of the
Decalogue: the first four commandments were taken to refer to duties to God,
the fifth through tenth to duties owed to fellow human beings. The first table
was religious; only the second table was properly subject to legitimate civil
coercion. From his own firm religious position, therefore, Roger Williams
developed the crucial importance of a sharp separation between the commands
of church and state.
Though sorely pressed at times (particularly by the troublesome radical
views and actions of Quakers), Rhode Island thus began a tradition of religious
tolerance for which the colony soon became notorious. A leading legal scholar
recently claimed that "[i]t is unlikely that the Rhode Island provisions had
much direct influence on subsequent developments of the free exercise
principle."'  Yet the very words of the Rhode Island Charter - particularly its
concernments ... not useing this libertie to licentiousnesse and profanenesse, nor to the
civil injurye or outward disturbance of others.
2 CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 46 (1936). After
quoting this portion of the Rhode Island Charter in her dissent in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 552, (1997), Justice O'Connor made the point that other colonies "similarly
guaranteed religious freedom, using language that paralleled that of the Rhode Island Charter
of 1663." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Concurring, Justice Scalia countered by emphasizing
the "'provisos' that significantly qualify the affirmative protections" granted in the early "'free
exercise' enactments." Id. at 539 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia relied primarily on
Hamburger, A Constitutional Right, supra note 2, at 915, and on Ellis West, The Case Against
a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591, 624
(1990). Neither of these scholars dealt with the issues presented by the "full" guarantee.
25 McConnell, supra note 2, at 1427. McConnell relies primarily on WILIAM GERALD
McLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT: THE BAPTIsTs AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE, 1630-1833 (1971). McConnell adds, however, that the language of the Rhode Island
Charter "had a second and third life elsewhere in the colonies," and that "the substance of these
early provisions later re-emerged as the most common pattern in the constitutions adopted by
the states after the Revolution." McConnell, supra note 2, at 1427. It is difficult to prove or
disprove "direct influence," of course: and the standard McConnell invokes - "subsequent
developments of the free exercise principle" - defies easy calibration. Moreover, leaders in the
Great Awakening of the 1740s and then again within the successful activism of Baptists in the
Revolutionary era rediscovered Williams and celebrated the experiments in religious freedom
in Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. Isaac Backus, for example, "utilized also the long-forgotten
arguments of Roger Williams to defend the doctrines of separation," and these were arguments
which Backus "knew thoroughly," according to his biographer, who claims in his preface that
Backus merits comparison with Williams. WniiAM GERALD McLOUGHLIN, ISAAC BACKUS
AND THE AMERICAN PIETISTIC TRADITION 124,191, xii (1967) [hereinafter McLOUGHLIN, ISAAC
BACKUS].
Some experts have emphasized the broad familiarity of those at the Constitutional
Convention with the religious freedom guarantees of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, see, e.g.,
LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 88 (1953); 1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH
AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 231 (1964). Others have emphasized a direct link between
a long-standing Christian tradition and Williams's radical ideas as to how to make freedom of
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guarantee of protection for manifestations of free and full conscience,
including actions as well as beliefs - began to recur in other texts. Moreover,
toleration proved difficult to contain within a New World full of relative
diversity, generally anxious for more settlers, and affording numerous avenues
of escape.26
B. Echoes: Jefferson and Madison
Extensive recent scholarship has been devoted to the history and meaning
of the Free Exercise Clause, tracing in particular its roots in the vehement,
even revolutionary, controversies surrounding religious freedom and the
21disestablishment of the Church of England and its successors in Virginia.
Indeed, we have been treated to an unusually direct clash within the Court over
who or what constitutes the relevant history for the First Amendment's
conscience real in a new world literally surrounded by the wilderness. According to a religious
studies expert, for example, the Jefferson-Madison "one-two punch on behalf of religious
freedom in the 1780s" had its "strongest connection... to the 'free church' strand of the
tradition, represented most characteristically by Roger Williams." David Little, Religion and
Civil Virtue in America: Jefferson's Statute Reconsidered, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE, supra
note 2 at 249. Even Perry Miller, who asserted in the early 1950s that Williams "exerted little
or no direct influence on theorists of the Revolution and the Constitution," went on to explain
that "as a figure and a reputation he was always there to remind Americans that no other
conclusion than absolute religious freedom was feasible in this society .... As a symbol,
Williams has become an integral element in the meaning of American democracy, along with
Jefferson and Lincoln." PERRY MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: His CONTRInUTION TO THE
AMERICAN TRADITION 254-55 (1953).
26 For example, as William Penn set about to create a haven for Quakers in the New World,
who at the time were still being banished, whipped, and occasionally hung in Massachusetts,
the initial laws of Pennsylvania unsurprisingly emphasized freedom of conscience. Yet in 1705,
the Pennsylvania General Assembly adopted a new law concerning "Liberty of Conscience"
guaranteeing that, in addition to not being molested or prejudiced for conscientious persuasion,
any of the populace could henceforth "[fireely and fully enjoy his or her Christian liberty in all
respects, without molestation or interruption." THE EARIEST PRINTED LAWS OF
PENNSYLVANIA, 1681-1713 36 (John D. Cushing ed., 1978).
27 The best recent account of the history of the Free Exercise Clause is McConnell, supra
note 2. For a careful critique of McConnell, see Hamburger, Constitutional Right, supra note
2, and for McConnell's reply see Michael McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update
andA Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. U. L. REv. 685 (1992). These and other scholars
have not much heeded earlier important work such as that by Leo Pfeffer and Mark DeWolfe
Howe. There are numerous gems concerning the antecedents, context, and conflicts over ideas
of religious freedom in the late eighteenth century within a fine series of essays published for
the bicentennial of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, written by Thomas Jefferson in
1777 and pushed through the thickets of Virginia politics by James Madison in 1785. THE
VIRGINIA STATUTE, supra note 2.
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Religion Clauses.2" Even the Library of Congress has been pulled into the
fray.2
9
This is surely not the place to respond systematically to the sustained assault
on the "wall of separation" metaphor launched in recent years by "conserva-
tive" Justices and commentators,"0 though some refutation beyond Justice
Souter's careful and quite gentle response seems in order. Perhaps the most
striking recent revisionist effort has been the attempt to drive apart the thought
of Jefferson and Madison, and thereby to lower or poke holes in what is
alleged to be Jefferson's more insistent "wall of separation" by emphasizing
Madison as more prominent for constitutional purposes and as more inclined
to favor religion.3 This purported division between Jefferson and Madison
seems dubious at best.32
28 Compare Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), with Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,609 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring). See also the competing opinions
of Justices Thomas, concurring, and Justice Souter dissenting - joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer- in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515
U.S. 819 (1995).
29 See Diego Ribadeneira, New Debate Flares Over Jefferson's View of Church and State,
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 1998, at B2.; Laurie Goldstein, Fresh Debate on 1802 Jefferson Letter,
NEW YORK TIMEs, Sept. 10, 1998, at A20 (reporting letter from two dozen historians criticizing
paper by James Huston, chief of the Library's manuscript division, about Thomas Jefferson's
1802 Letter to the Danbury Baptist Association that contains the famous "wall of separation"
metaphor).
30 See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (building upon an argument
made in a brief filed on behalf of Douglas T. Smith and other intervenors in the Wallace case);
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 852 (Thomas, J., concurring). But see, e.g., Justice Souter's reply id.
at 868-74. This campaign is said to contrast to that of "ideological plaintiffs," who insist on a
strict separation approach to school funding issues. For a particularly irascible example of the
argument, see RICHARD E. MORGAN, DISABLING AMERICA: THE "RIGHTS INDUSTRY" IN OUR
TIME 22-45 (1984). See also Glendon & Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, supra note 2, at 482
(1991).
3' Michael McConnell, for example, insists on the importance of "the contrasting positions
of Jefferson and Madison regarding the religion issue." McConnell, supra note 2, at 1449. He
associates Jefferson with Locke, and with an "Enlightenment-deist-rationalist stance toward
religious freedom." Id. at 1452. McConnell claims that, by contrast, Madison had a "more
affirmative stance toward religion" and a "more generous vision of religious liberty" that "more
faithfully reflected the popular understanding of the free exercise provision that was to emerge
both in state constitutions and the Bill of Rights." Id. at 1453, 1455.
32 See, e.g., JACK RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 14 (1990); Dumas Malone, The Madison-Jefferson Friendship, in JAMES MADISON
ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 303, 304 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985) ("The two men may not have been
entirely consistent about other forms of freedom, although they were powerful advocates of
them, but on religious freedom they were absolutely consistent."); ADRIENNE KOCH, THE GREAT
COLLABORATION 30,49 (1950). While those who would divide the two Virginians stress that
Jefferson derived his ideas from John Locke, other experts note that John Locke
was not merely a religious man. He was a master theologian with his own view of
revelation and its exposition, with his own very clear, very moderate, very persuasive
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It is helpful first to take a step back: As Thomas Jefferson grudgingly
awaited his first and perhaps most noteworthy brush with greatness in
Philadelphia in the late spring and summer of 1776, he could hardly contain
his frustration at being obliged to be away from Virginia while a new Virginia
Constitution was in the works. Failing in his effort to be recalled, Jefferson
prepared and sent three draft constitutions to the convention, but it remains
unclear when his drafts actually arrived. It is clear, however, that Jefferson's
third draft - sent via George Wythe and Richard Henry Lee - reached the
delegates before they had formally finished their work, and parts of it were
added as a preamble to the Virginia Constitution, albeit not enough of it to
quell Jefferson's serious doubts about the constitution as it was enacted.
For our purposes, however, it is striking that Jefferson's draft echoed Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania when it provided: "[a]ll persons shall have full and
free liberty of religious opinion; nor shall any be compelled to frequent or
maintain any religious institution."3 The similarity is hardly surprising.
Lawyers tend to look to what others have done in similar situations, and
Jefferson was exceptional for many things, including his dogged willingness
to do extensive historical research and to take pains about his writing, often
invoking phrases he had heard or read elsewhere. 34
vision of the essentials of Christianity free from the dogma and the controversies, the
elaborations, and, as he thought, the quibbles that had marred that exposition up to his
time. That he constantly appeals to reason and makes reasonableness his criterion should
lead no one to suppose that he is a rationalist in the sense of a critic of Christianity
superior to its influences.
JOHN T. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 76 (1987). Moreover, an earlier
attack on the "wall of separation" approach criticized Madison precisely because of the
closeness of his thought to that of John Locke. See, e.g., John Courtney Murray, Law or
Prepossessions?, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 29 (1949). For the initial disagreement
between Jefferson and Madison about clergy serving in public offices, see McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.S. 618, 624 (1978). Madison eventually convinced Jefferson that clergymen should not
be banned on grounds both of protecting free exercise of religion and because "it violate[s]
another article of the plan which exempts religion from the cognizance of Civil power." I I
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 288 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977).
33 THE VIRGINIA STATUTE, supra note 2; see also NOONAN, supra note 32 at 76.
34 See PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (1997); Thomas E. Buckley, S.J., The Political Theology of Thomas Jefferson,
in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE, supra note 2, at 85. Jefferson had no doubt that "[i]fis unalienable
right... is religious," as he put the point in his cryptic debate notes for a speech in the Virginia
House of Delegates in the Fall of 1776. 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 537 (Julian P.
Boyd ed., 1950) (emphasis in original). Philip Hamburger provides a careful, illuminating study
of the role of natural rights claims for religious freedom in the context of an ongoing dispute
between advocates of equal protection and equal civil rights. See Hamburger, Equality and
Diversity, supra note 2. However, Hamburger does not discuss the contemporaneous attention
given to the vindication of "full" and "complete" religious freedom.
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If anything, however, James Madison sought to go further, though his
language was quite similar to what Jefferson proposed. As Madison overcame
his shyness in his fight to amend George Mason's proposed language for the
Virginia Constitution, Madison suggested the following:
That Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of
discharging it, being under the direction of reason and conviction only, not of
violence or compulsion, all men are equally entitled to the full and free exercise
of it, according to the dictates of Conscience; and therefore that no man or class
of men, ought, on account of religion to be invested with peculiar emoluments
or privileges, nor subjected to any penalties or disabilities, unless under colour
of religion, the preservation of equal liberty and the existence of the State be
manifestly endangered.35
Like Jefferson, his trusted ally in the long campaign for religious freedom in
Virginia, Madison thus invoked the old Rhode Island "full and free" formula.
Madison went further in that he attached the "full and free" guarantee to the
exercise of one's reason and conviction - explicitly covering more than did
Jefferson's connection of the "full and free" guarantee only to "opinion."36
Madison also sought to link the new guarantee directly to the demands of
equal entitlement. Moreover, for Madison, religion could not be the basis
either for favorable emoluments or privileges, or for any penalties or
disabilities. The only limitation upon this sweeping Madisonian principle, in
fact, was when it was necessary to preserve equal liberty and if the existence
of the state were otherwise to be "manifestly endangered.""
35 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 177 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal
eds., 1962) (emphasis added). (I have generally referred back to the Madison Papers whose first
volume is cited here, though the series had many different editors since it began in 1962).
Madison later went out of his way to annotate in his own hand a printed version of the 1776
enactment, and to claim it emphatically as his own. The editors of the Madison Papers assume
that Madison penned what they call this "remarkable footnote" many years later, and that his
memory was not entirely accurate. See id. at 174-79. There is a similar problem, of course, in
the frequent reliance on Madison's notes of the Constitutional Convention - the best source we
have - which he edited and did not make available until many decades later. In any event, the
version quoted, which the editors consider "a largely meaningless whole," reflects Madison's
mature reflection as to what at least he wished he had done as a young man. As illustrated in
quotations infra notes 36-37, Madison did recall accurately the parts of his contemporaneous
1776 amendments that are directly relevant.
36 See id. at 174. The quotation is from Madison's first proposed amendment, dated
between May 29 and June 12, 1776.
31 Madison's second proposed amendment, which also dates from between May 29-June
12, 1776, would have protected "the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of
conscience, unpunished and unrestrained by the magistrate, unless the preservation of equal
liberty and the existence of the State are manifestly endangered." Id. at 174-75. It thus
somewhat anticipates the "compelling state interest" test, the standard of review used in free
exercise cases generally for decades until that standard was rejected in Smith. Though much
480
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It is well-known that Madison got his start as a vocal proponent of religious
freedom when, as a 22-year-old, he was shocked to discover five or six "well
meaning" Baptists in close confinement in the jail in a neighboring Virginia
county. In his famous letter to his Princeton friend William Bradford,
Madison revealed his "unaccustomed fervor" as he wrote concerning "[t]hat
diabolical Hell conceived principle of persecution rages among some and to
their eternal Infamy the Clergy can furnish their quota of Imps for such
business."3 Madison early in life thus experienced and viscerally identified
with those persecuted for their religious beliefs. Madison's strong reaction -
"[t]his vexes me the most of any thing whatsoever" '39 - apparently anchored
his lifelong fervor in favor of religious freedom. There may have been
political advantages, to be sure, but it is striking that Madison repeatedly
demonstrated an unusual ability to understand the demands of various points
of view about religion, even when they differed markedly from his own
perspective. Empathy with dissenters, for example, helps explain Madison's
insistence that government could not incorporate the Episcopal Church, give
land to a Baptist Church, or even run the risk of being seduced by the "laud-
able" motive of supporting the chaplaincy in the armed forces and Congress.'
Despite all the recent revisionism, there seems little disagreement as to the
central constitutional role played by James Madison. After all, he was the
initial proponent of language that, following redrafting, became the text of the
First Amendment. Yet there has been little notice of some of the most
suggestive wording of the constitutional guarantee as James Madison first
proposed it during the First Congress in June 1789."' Madison moved to
has been written in recent years about the breach of the peace limitation on religious freedom,
see, e.g., Hamburger, Constitutional Right, supra note 2, Madison's explicit rejection of that
standard as early as 1776 has received little if any notice.
38 1 THEPAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 35, at 106.
39 id.
40 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 489-90 (J.D. Richardson ed., 1900); see
also Elizabeth Fleet, Madison's "Detached Memoranda," in 3 WILLIAM AND MARY
QUARTERLY (3d Series) 559 (1946).
4' Those who seek to undermine or to breach the "wall of separation" approach to the
Establishment Clause emphasize the fact that once, during the War of 1812, Madison invoked
God in a presidential proclamation. It seems more telling that Madison several times refused
such proclamations on grounds of his fear of religious establishment, and later expressed his
great regret that he had abandoned his principles under political pressure during wartime. See
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,609 (1992). Madison's 1813 Thanksgiving Proclamation hardly
counteracts his long campaign against religious establishment throughout his adult life, just as
a stipend to support a religious chaplain to an Indian tribe does not outweigh Jefferson's
manifold objections to religious establishment. Such arguments tend to isolate each historical
figure at a particular moment and to extrapolate very liberally from some specific deed, rather
than to attend to the substantial efforts and great pride these two men invested throughout their
lives in the pursuit of freedom of religion.
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amend the Constitution as follows: "[tihe civil rights of none shall be abridged
on account of religious belief or worship; nor shall any national religion be
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner,
or on any pretext, infringed."42
Most revealing for our purposes is Madison's proposed guarantee of 'full
and equal rights of conscience." The guarantee reads as absolute. It disallows
any pretext or any manner of infringement. This is noteworthy in itself,
particularly because this guarantee was not redundant, but rather an addition
to the proposal's initial protection against infringement of civil rights on
account of religious belief or worship. Still more significantly, however,
Madison's phrase "full and equal" encapsulates an approach to freedom that,
in its very terms, appears to extend beyond formal equal treatment.
Madison's draft was altered significantly, of course, in the process of
becoming the First Amendment that we all know. Yet it is likely that, as
Professor McConnell put it, "the deletion of 'full' by the [Select] Committee
was no more than stylistic and that the word 'equal' was deleted so as not to
Those who doubt Madison's rigorous opposition to the establishment of religion, for
example, have to explain away his eloquence in his Memorial and Remonstrance, in which
Madison invoked the proofs of history in the "American Theatre" that had demonstrated already
how much the "equal and compleat liberty" of religion could successfully counter the
"malignant influence on the health and prosperity of the state, which was discoverable
throughout history whenever the secular arm sought to 'intermeddle with Religion."' NOONAN,
supra note 32, at 110. They also must overlook Madison's successful joint venture with
Jefferson during which they advocated vigorously on many fronts and persuaded 'Virginia to
adopt its pioneering Statute for Religious Freedom. Ironically, one does not find those who
would cast asunder Jefferson and Madison, purporting to be bound by original intent, and who
tend to favor states rights and even, at times, to question the application of the First Amendment
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, mentioning that, on the eve of the
Constitutional Convention, Madison favored an approach that would allow "a due supremacy
of the national authority, and leave in force the local authorities so far as they can be
subordinately useful." Letter to Edmund Randolph, in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 368
(Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1975). Unlike the James Madison who was
author of the Virginia Resolutions protesting the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, James
Madison in Philadelphia in 1787 fought for a congressional veto over state laws and advocated
power in Congress to legislate in all cases when Congress deemed the states incompetent to act.
The James Madison who proposed the Religion Clauses in the First Congress that led to the first
part of the First Amendment
conceived this to be the most valuable amendment in the whole list. If there was any
reason to restrain the Government of- the United States from infringing upon these
essential rights, it was equally necessary that they should be secured against State
Governments. He thought that if they provided against the one, it was as necessary to
provide against the other.
1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 18, at 755.
42 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 18, at 755. Madison's proposal and the subsequent
cryptic debate and redrafting process are set out usefully in NOONAN, supra note 32, at 119-26.
These materials, as well as state and other sources, are in McConnell, supra note 2.
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create a negative inference."'4 It may be sensible, in fact, to discern elements
of Madison's guarantee of "full" rights of conscience in the Free Exercise
Clause, and to see some of his "equal rights" concern in the guarantee against
the establishment of religion. Such an approach would not resolve all the
tension between the two clauses, to be sure, but it would bolster a unitary,
structural approach to the Religion Clauses.' Such an approach wisely echoes
Madison's proposal, first made as early as 1776, that provided that fear of a
breach of the peace would not provide adequate justification for governmental
intrusion on beliefs or actions embedded within the freedom of conscience of
an individual or a dissenting religious group.45
At the very least, Madison's initial proposal on religious freedom provides
relatively clear evidence of this crucial constitutional actor's idea about what
would constitute an appropriate guarantee of religious freedom. It is also
consistent with the major innovation at the Constitutional Convention that
43 McConnell, supra note 2, at 1482.
" Justice Brennan, concurring in the decision invalidating Bible reading in the public
schools, proclaimed, "the role of the Establishment Clause as co-guarantor, with the Free
Exercise Clause, of religious liberty. The Framers did not entrust the liberty of religious beliefs
to either clause alone." Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 256 (1963). For
surprising overlapping support for such an integrated approach, compare PFEFFER, supra note
25, at 121-24, with Glendon & Yanes, supra note 2. Like misery and politics, law and religion
seem to make strange bed-fellows. A unified approach - though it is not without internal
tension, can be overly abstract, and does entail considerable unpredictability - seems to echo
Madison's concerns in his 1785 Memorial and Remonstrance. Madison repeatedly warned that
the majority would tend to trespass on the rights of the minority. Thus, for example, he asked
rhetorically, "[w]ho does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in
exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of
Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?" NOONAN, supra note 32, at 108. To Madison, it
was obvious that "equality... ought to be the basis of every law;" and he proclaimed that
"[a]bove all are [all men] to be considered as retaining an 'equal title to the free exercise of
religion according to the dictates of Conscience."' 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 300
(Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973) (quoting Article XVI of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights) (emphasis in original).
" It is a commonplace that in the early years of the Republic, one state after another
embraced Madison's position, disestablished churches, and began to accommodate the free
exercise of religion by dissenters. Thus, Isaac Backus spotted a trend and could proclaim in
1805 that:
[t]he liberty that [Roger Williams] was for, civil and religious, is now enjoyed in thirteen
of the seventeen of the United States of America. No tax for any religious minister is
imposed by authority in any of the said thirteen States, and their power is much weakened
in the other four.
MCLOUGHUN, IsAAC BACKUS, supra note 25, at 209. The remarkably kinetic quality of legal
change within American history is seldom acknowledged by lawyers and judges who tend to
seek abstract rules - purportedly established with simple clarity in the past - at a particular
frozen moment in order to resolve complex contemporary questions.
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eliminated religious qualifications for federal office holders.' Madison
promised Baptist leaders in Virginia that, if elected to the First Congress, he
would do his best for "the most satisfactory provisions for all essential rights,
particularly the rights of Conscience in the fullest latitude." '47 Far from being
the reluctant dragon portrayed by Justice Rehnquist, Madison became a
veritable nag in that first Congress due to his efforts to amend the
Constitution."
As Jefferson and Madison discussed whether it was necessary or wise to
amend the federal constitution, both repeatedly gave freedom of religion pride
of place. These two friends, who characteristically studied past precedent
carefully and who mutually delighted in their abilities as wordsmiths, again
and again struggled in various venues to protect fundamental principles of
religious freedom. In addition to guaranteeing free and equal treatment, both
men also explicitly sought to protect full freedom of conscience.
III. FULL AND EQUAL IN THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA
As a matter of logic, full protection may be different from equal protection.
"Full" implies substantive content - and perhaps some particularized
consideration of differences - while "equal" generally is taken to require only
46 See MORTON BORDEN,JEWS,TURKS, ANDINFIDELS (1984). Those who like to emphasize
the presence of chaplains in Congress tend not to mention their absence in the Constitutional
Convention. When Benjamin Franklin proposed that each session begin with a prayer, his
motion was given the silent treatment and defeated by a motion to adjourn. See RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, vol. 1, 450-52 (Max Fan-and ed., 1966).
47 Letter from James Madison to the Rev. George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), in 11 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 404 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977). Madison needed
the support of the Baptists to defeat his friendly rival, James Monroe, for a seat in the House.
" In his argument from history within his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985),
then-Justice Rehnquist perceived Madison as "less... a dedicated advocate of the wisdom of
such measures than ... a prudent statesman seeking the enactment of measures sought by a
number of his fellow citizens which could surely do no harm and might do a great deal of
good." Id. at 93-94 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist conceded that Madison was
"undoubtedly the most important architect among the Members of the House of the Amend-
ments which became the Bill of Rights," but he insisted without citations that "it was James
Madison speaking as an advocate of sensible legislative compromise, not as an advocate of
incorporating the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty into the United States Constitution." Id.
at 97-98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But see, e.g., DOUGLASS ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING
FATHERS (1974); RAKOVE, supra note 15. Madison tried for nearly a month to get the House
to consider his proposed amendments, and finally on July 21, 1789 he successfully "begged the
House to indulge him in the further consideration of amendments to the Constitution" during
what seemed "a moment of leisure." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. supra note 18, at 660. See generally
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURcES, AND ORIGINS (Neil Cogan
ed., 1997).
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even-handed process. 49 The equal protection doctrine now centers almost
entirely on equal treatment. The "protection" element of the equal protection
guarantee has virtually disappeared. Indeed, even unequal treatment is not
considered constitutionally problematic unless there has been a showing of
discriminatory motive.50 It is as if the Court has decided that equality has been
achieved, albeit at an unspecified magic historical moment, and that now only
purposeful deviations from this happy norm need be remedied."
This attitude surely was not and hardly could have been the general
approach during and immediately following the Civil War and the liberation
of millions of slaves. In addition to the Reconstruction amendments, often
rightfully called a Second Constitution, Congress passed statute after statute
seeking to provide effective federal protection for the civil rights of the newly-
freed slaves and their allies. Again and again, Congress guaranteed "full and
equal" benefits of the laws, rights, and access. The story of this sustained
congressional effort to ensure that the war's horrific carnage was not in vain
has been told in considerable detail elsewhere. 2
49 See MARTHA MiNow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW (1990); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1982). For some of the best critical responses to Westen, see R. Kent Greenawalt, How Empty
is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1983); Kenneth Simons, Equality as a
Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1985); Anthony D'Amato, Comment, Is Equality a
Totally Empty Idea?, 81 MICH. L. REV. 600 (1983). Westen responded to his critics in several
articles, and then published PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
RHETORICAL FORCE OF EQUALITY IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990). See also
Hamburger, Equality and Diversity, supra note 2.
" See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
"' For a clear description and cogent critique of this approach in the realm of public policy
discourse, see DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING
(1997). I tried to put the Court's sanguine doctrinal approach into a larger historical and
constitutional context in the chapter, Involuntary Groups and the Role of History in American
Law, in AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 127-49 (1995).
52 See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1988);
HAROLD M. HYMAN & Wn.uAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875 (1982); LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: THE
AFrERMATH OF SLAVERY (1979); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1990); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
POLIrICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988). My efforts to detail these developments
include Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L. J. 1916 (1987) and
Aviam Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique ofRaoulfBerger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV.
651 (1979) [hereinafter Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights]. See also, for example, Steven J.
Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment,
41 DUKE L. J. 507 (1991); Earl M. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws - A
Historical Inquiry, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499 (1985).
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For our purposes, it is significant enough that the 39th Congress - the very
body that drafted and passed the text that was declared ratified in 1868 as the
Fourteenth Amendment we know today - adopted the Civil Rights Act of
1866. Congress based this statute on its new enforcement power as provided
by Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. Indeed, the issue of Congress's
authority was clearly joined when President Andrew Johnson vetoed the bill,
and Congress overrode a presidential veto on a major piece of legislation for
the first time in its history.
The 1866 Civil Rights Act directly rejected the Dred Scott decision even
more forcefully than the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
("RFRA") rejected the Smith decision. The 1866 Act began: "[tihat all
persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign Power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States.53 According to Congress, "such citizens of every race and color" were
to be guaranteed a list of enumerated legal rights "without regard to any
previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude."' Moreover, these
new citizens now were promised the same right "to full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed
by white citizens."55
Extensive Congressional hearings had emphasized the quotidian horrors
under the Black Codes, as well as numerous blatant atrocities and failures to
intervene by state and local authorities in the South. The 39th Congress
therefore found it necessary to act on the federal level. In their view, this was
hardly a time for great deference to the wisdom of the Supreme Court - the
very people who brought the nation Dred Scott. Nor did the 39th Congress
believe the country could afford to wait for ratification of the new constitu-
tional amendment it was drafting to make constitutionally permanent the
guarantees of the 1866 Act, including the almost verbatim repeat of the
Enforcement Clause first constitutionalized in the Thirteenth Amendment.
When the Court struck down RFRA in Boerne, it simply ignored this history
of congressional power to remedy the deprivation of rights against a back-
ground of judicial failure to do so. Congress's bold rejection of Dred Scott in
the 1866 Civil Rights Act simply cannot be reconciled with Boerne's
proclamation of the Court's exclusive authority.56 Under Boerne and its
53 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1991) and 42 U.S.C § 1982 (1978)); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1857 (1866).
' Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1991) and 42 U.S.C § 1982 (1978)).
55 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1991) and 42 U.S.C § 1982 (1978) (emphasis supplied)).
56 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 998
(1992), Justice Scalia, dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
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insistently formalistic view of the separation of powers, only the Court could
determine that the time was ripe to overrule Dred Scott. In fact, as a formal
matter, however, the Supreme Court has never overruled its own tragic blunder
in that decision. 57
The Boerne Court's crabbed view of Congress's Enforcement Clause power
under the Fourteenth Amendment paid no heed whatsoever to historical
context. Instead, Justice Kennedy somewhat testily declared for the majority:
When the political branches of the Government act against the background of a
judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood
that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the
respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary
expectations must be disappointed."
Purportedly concerned about "vital principles necessary to maintain
separation of powers and the federal balance,"'9 Boerne forbade Congress to
Thomas, excoriated his colleagues for their refusal to overturn Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). He wrote:
In my history-book, the Court was covered with dishonor and deprived of legitimacy by
Dred Scott v. Sandford, an erroneous (and widely opposed) opinion that it did not
abandon, rather than by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, which produced the famous
"switch in time" from the Court's erroneous (and widely opposed) constitutional
opposition to the social measures of the New Deal.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 998 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
51 In his classic work, Don Fehrenbacher quoted dictum from Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244, 273-74 (1901), to the effect that the Civil War "produced such changes in judicial, as well
as public sentiment, as to seriously impair the authority of [Dred Scott]." Id. Fehrenbacher then
observed, however, "[tihis was perhaps as close as the Supreme Court ever came to declaring
the Dred Scott decision totally overruled." DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTTr CASE
585-86 (1978). While it generally has been assumed that the post-Civil War constitutional
amendments rejected Dred Scott, as a formal matter no Supreme Court opinion even has
purported to overrule it.
The Boerne logic, moreover, does not fit the context in which the 39th Congress passed
the 1866 Civil Rights Act and drafted what became the Fourteenth Amendment. The early
Reconstruction period was hardly a time of great respect for, or deference to, the United States
Supreme Court. As the English historian W.R. Brock observed:
If one prong of the drive for legislative supremacy was directed against the Executive, the
other was necessarily directed against the Supreme Court. The prestige of the Court, with
the odium of Dred Scott still hanging about it, did not stand high, and the whole question
of its political function was brought to a head by the famous case of ex parte Milligan.
W.R. BROCK, AN AMERIcAN CRIsis 262 (1963). Indeed, it was largely fear of the Supreme
Court that led the men of the 39th Congress to try to "constitutionalize" through the Fourteenth
Amendment the federal guarantee they had provided in the 1866 Civil Rights Act, based on the
Thirteenth Amendment. For a detailed discussion of this point and its context, see Soifer,
Protecting Civil Rights, supra note 52.
"8 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
59 Id.
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alter the difficult burden of proof required in free exercise cases that the Court
had newly established in Smith.6 Defining and categorizing this "burden" has
been a longstanding and key gatekeeping device in religion cases. 6' In the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Congress sought to alter the burden of
proof and the standard employed by judges so that free exercise rights could
be protected beyond overt discrimination or indifference. Appearing quite
defensive about its recent Smith ruling, however, the Boerne majority boldly
swept away RFRA, and with it apparently a good deal more of Congress's
power to enforce other constitutional rights - and certainly a critical element
of the nation's historical commitment to the protection of minority rights.
Good arguments have been made for and against both the wisdom and the
constitutionality of RFRA.62 In the factual context underlying Boerne, for
example, RFRA raised significant Establishment Clause problems that only
Justice Stevens worried about directly. Moreover, RFRA's very breadth - and
the fact that the claim made by Archbishop Flores to renovate and expand a
church building had substantial implications for zoning power generally -
undoubtedly contributed to the Boerne result.
It may have been somewhat false labeling for Congress to lay claim to the
restoration of religious freedom through RFRA, though the aggressive sweep
of Justice Scalia's Smith opinion surely made it seem that the rare victories for
Free Exercise over the previous several decades were about to be obliterated
entirely. Moreover, it is likely that Archbishop Flores would and should have
o Indeed the Court criticized the legislative record behind the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA") because it "lacks examples of modem instances of generally
applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry." Id. at 508. This might seem a careless
overreading of Smith, which never mentioned "bigotry" as necessary to meet the constitutional
standard. Yet the Boerne Court also criticized the legislative hearings: "It is difficult to
maintain that they ["anecdotal evidence" introduced in the hearings] are examples of legislation
enacted or enforced due to animus or hostility to the burdened religious practices or that they
indicate some widespread pattern of religious discrimination in this country." Id. This second-
guessing of the legislative process is revealing, particularly because the Court recognized that
"[a]s a general matter, it is for Congress to determine the method by which it will reach a
decision." Id. at 508-09. Protesting much too much in this way suggests considerable
defensiveness about the Smith decision's departures from settled law. It also indicates how
difficult actual proof of a violation of religious freedom will be after Smith, notwithstanding
Lukumi, discussed supra note 6.
6' Lupu, supra note 2. Indeed, "[slome shifting of burdens is inevitable wherever there is
religious liberty." ROSENBLUM, supra note 2, at 92.
62 See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Laurence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994); Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and
the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 171
(1995); William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Establishment, Equal
Protection and Free Speech Concerns, 56 MONT. L. REv. 227 (1995); and other articles in this
fine Montana Law Review Symposium on RFRA.
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lost his case both before RFRA took effect and even under RFRA, had his
property dispute gone to trial. Prior to Smith, the key nettlesome issue, of
course, revolved around deciding when some government action imposed a
substantial burden on religious activity - and then, even if a substantial burden
were found, determining if some compelling state interest, narrowly drawn,
might nevertheless prevail.
The degree of deference thus generally afforded government interests even
within the pre-Smith universe might not have fit comfortably within the "full
and free" guarantees of conscience propounded by Madison and Jefferson.
But the SmithlBoere Court's brusque unwillingness to take acts of conscience
into account at all - whether or not such acts are religiously based - seems to
mark a substantial departure from the bold experimental hopes of the founders'
generation. Cloaked in the abstract garb of separation of powers and
federalism, the New Formalism rejects much of the painful progress we have
made as a nation, at least in part through a kind of constitutional common law
construing free exercise. The Supreme Court now seeks to preclude that
approach. The Court's new precedents are sure to constrain, at least some-
what, the countless decisions made by individuals and groups throughout the
United States who pursue freedom of conscience at least to some degree aware
that they operate within the shadow of our law.
It may be useful to recognize how the Boerne majority opinion operated
simultaneously on three separate, significant jurisdictional levels. First, as
already discussed briefly, the Court felt obliged in defense of the Smith
decision to rebuff emphatically what the Justices perceived to be Congress's
intrusion onto turf the Court had staked out exclusively for itself. Second, in
the name of the "federal balance," the Court emphasized its enthusiasm in
Smith for leaving matters of religious accommodation to local and state
political processes. Third, Boerne also firmly rejected a more personal claim:
that religious belief might trump some general laws of neutral application,
even when those laws were not "passed because of religious bigotry.' '63 A
brief separate discussion of each of the three may prove illuminating.
A. "Substantive in Operation and Effect" '
To limit Congressional power, Boerne promulgated a new constitutional
standard of "proportionality and congruence," to be used as the general
63 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
Id. at 520. Conceding that the line "is not easy to discern," the Court drew a
constitutional boundary between "measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions,"
which are within Congress's broad power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
"measures that make a substantive change in the governing law," which Congress may not
enact. Id.
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measure of Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment's Enforce-
ment Clause.65 As a legal standard, "proportionality and congruence"
necessarily requires judges to make discretionary judgments. No benchmark
is set in advance, and the inquiry required to adjudicate proportionality and
congruence pushes judges into doubly subjective decision-making about
policy and politics, apparently unwilling to be aided by the views of Congress.
This is hardly judicial restraint. Nor does it begin to resonate with the
historical context of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Boerne Court never mentioned the 1866 Civil Rights Act in the course
of its dip into Fourteenth Amendment history. The majority invoked
"[s]cholars of successive generations" but relied on nothing published later
than 1966. Taken at face value, Boerne's obsession with exclusive judicial
authority not only would have made Dred Scott the law of the land until at
least 1868, but it would also apparently invalidate the 1866 Civil Rights Act's
broad array of federal protections for enumerated civil rights. 6
That this comparison with 1866 is not simply a provocative extrapolation
became chillingly clear when the Court invoked the Civil Rights Cases as a
primary source for its constitutional views. Infamously, the Court's decision
to invalidate the guarantee made in the 1875 Civil Rights Act of "full and
equal enjoyment" of a broad range of public accommodations did a good deal
to legitimate the rise of Jim Crow.67 In Boerne, the Court declared that the
65 It probably is hard to find reasonable people in the United States today who are opposed
to proportionality and congruence, though the Court seems thus to characterize the vast
congressional majorities who approved the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. But
cf. Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), during his 1964 presidential campaign ("Extremism in the
pursuit of liberty is no vice.").
66 The constitutional basis for the 1866 Civil Rights Act was the Enforcement Clause of the
Thirteenth Amendment, whose words were repeated almost verbatim as Enforcement Clauses
in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Court upheld numerous federal civil rights
statutes based entirely on these post-Civil War constitutional grants of power to Congress, even
in the face of federalism attacks. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding,
in a unanimous opinion written by then-Justice Rehnquist, that Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power allowed Congress to abrogate state's Eleventh Amendment immunity and
to permit state to be sued directly for retrospective damages); City of Rome v. U.S., 446 U.S.
156 (1980) (upholding amendments of Voting Rights Act of 1965, based on Fifteenth
Amendment enforcement power that required federal preclearance of electoral changes that
need not violate the Constitution). Even the decision in the Civil Rights Cases acknowledged
more congressional power than Boerne appears to recognize.
67 The Civil Rights Act of 1875 provided:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to thefull and
equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns,
public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement;
subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to
citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.
Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335 (1875) (emphasis added).
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reasoning of the Civil Rights Cases about Congress' Section 5 power "has not
been questioned."6
This remarkable assertion poses an important further question: not
questioned by whom? Does questioning by anyone other than the Justices of
the Court qualify? In their defensiveness about Smith and their haste to
establish judicial exclusivity, the Justices apparently simply missed broad
societal refutation of the Civil Rights Cases through statutes as well as in more
general ways. Many Americans have had and still do have serious questions
about what the Court said and did when it failed to allow Congress to reach
"unjust discrimination" in the Civil Rights Cases:
If the laws themselves make any unjust discrimination, amenable to the
prohibitions of the 14th Amendment, Congress has full power to afford a remedy
under that amendment and in accordance with it. When a man has emerged from
slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable
concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the process of his
elevation when he takes the rank of mere citizen, and ceases to be a special
favorite of the laws.69
According to the Civil Rights Cases, the time for formal equality had
already arrived eighteen years after the end of slavery. By 1883, it was high
time for former slaves to stop looking for federal protection. "It would be
running the slavery argument into the ground," said the Court, to allow
Congress's constitutional enforcement power to apply to the denial of access
to places of public accommodation on the basis of race.70
To be sure, the question of what the limits ought to be when Congress
invokes its enforcement power has long been nettlesome. But the Boerne
6 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525.
9 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). For the 8-1 majority, Justice Bradley
went on to argue that before the abolition of slavery, "no one, at that time, thought" that the
denial of "all the privileges enjoyed by white citizens" or being "subjected to discriminations
in the enjoyment of accommodations in inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement"
might be "any invasion of their personal status as freemen." Id. at 31-32. That the majority was
wrong as a matter of the law is demonstrated in Joseph Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public
Accommodations and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996). But a careful reading
of the Civil Rights Cases in its entirety reveals how chilling it is that the Boerne Court borrowed
from and invoked the "not questioned" trope in the context of the Civil Rights Cases. In doing
so, the Court performs its own utterance - it directly echoes the Civil Rights Cases decision and
blatantly ignores what has been widely regarded as societal progress in the realm of racial
discrimination since 1883, including the guarantee against racial discrimination in access to
places of public accommodations in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a. Indeed
the 1964 Civil Rights Act itself - and the need to stretch to find a Commerce Clause basis
because of the Civil Rights Cases precedent- might properly be viewed as seriously questioning
the Civil Rights Cases reasoning and holding, if one is willing to look up briefly from the pages
of the U.S. Reports.
70 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24.
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Court's egregious use of the Civil Rights Cases as its key precedent, and the
insistent exclusivity of its proclamation about constitutional wisdom - and
constitutional jurisdiction, for that matter- are striking attempts to knock most
of the pieces off the board. The holding in Boerne seems to go far beyond the
demands of the case actually before the Court and to extend well past issues
of religious freedom. Instead of recognizing the Court's own complicity in
aiding Jim Crow by eviscerating a broad range of protections that Congress
sought to provide in the decade after the Civil War, the Boerne Court may
have struck an even greater blow against the protection of rights by fundamen-
tally and broadly constricting Congress' protective power, granted explicitly
by the Enforcement Clauses of the three Reconstruction Amendments.7'
B. "The States' traditional prerogatives"'72
In the name of states' rights within the interminable federalism debate, the
current Court has cut back vigorously on the power of Congress and other
federal sources to limit state authority. That campaign advanced significantly
in several decisions handed down the same week as Boerne.7 Indeed, it is
clear that a major element of the Court's objection to RFRA was the Justices'
sense of too much intrusion by Congress into matters best left to state
authorities. They reasoned, for example, that: "[tihe substantial costs RFRA
exacts, both in practical terms of imposing a heavy litigation burden on the
States and in terms of curtailing their traditional general regulatory power, far
exceed any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free
Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith. 74
This quasi-legislative judicial balancing is surprising in itself. It seems even
more surprisingly subjective when one recognizes that the absence of a pattern
or practice under the Free Exercise Clause, as interpreted in Smith, must be
7' The Boerne majority acknowledged that "the specific holdings of these early cases
[several decisions between 1875 and 1903 that narrowed or invalidated civil rights guarantees]
might have been superseded or modified," yet Justice Kennedy insisted that "their treatment of
Congress' Sec. 5 power as corrective or preventive, not definitional, has not been questioned."
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525. It thus remains the Court's own murky business, of course, to
define what is in fact an unconstitutional definitional power, as compared to constitutionally
more tolerable corrective or preventive congressional efforts.
72 Id. at 534.
73 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating provisions of Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act as unconstitutional commandeering of state officials by
requiring them to perform background checks of prospective handgun purchasers); Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (distinguishing doctrine of Exparte Young,
209 U.S. 1234 (1908) and holding that the Eleventh Amendment implicitly barred declaratory
and injunctive action by a tribe alleging ownership of state lands).
74 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534.
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based on a very small sample indeed, given the very brief time between
Smith's radical doctrinal departure and the passage of RFRA. Moreover, the
Court's lack of concern for those who suffer from unconstitutional conduct
that affects their religious practices, combined with the solicitude it expresses
for state and local regulatory interests such as zoning, contrasts starkly with
the Court's recent substantial constitutional concern for even de minimis
intrusions on property rights through zoning and other forms of state and local
regulation.7" Finally, the Boerne Court was so eager to repel "a congressional
intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to
regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens" that it gave no indication
whatsoever as to whether RFRA's coverage of federal governmental entities
was valid or not.76
Contemporary federalism claims almost surely would have greatly surprised
supporters of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Deference to the states was hardly the lesson that the Radical Republicans -
and the Moderates allied with them largely through President Johnson's
blunders - drew from a gruesome war fought in large measure exactly to
defeat states' rights claims." Whether there is much precision possible in the
Boerne concept of "traditional general regulatory power" of the states, or in
the more basic idea of federalism as a constitutional standard proclaimed by
the current Court are issues that are much debated today and beyond the scope
of this essay.
By focusing briefly on the issue of perspective in a small sampling of recent
Religion Clause cases, however, we can discern the crucial, vexing issues of
judicial role and suitable detachment. Justice O'Connor led the way in recent
years in directly discussing the importance of perspective within the larger
problem of religious and secular coexistence in our society. "Because of this
coexistence," she stated in one of her first opinions construing the Religion
Clauses, "it is inevitable that the secular interests of government and the
71 See, e.g., Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998); Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992);
Nolan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
76 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534. This omission may be simple sloppiness, or it may be
an effort implicitly to leave the federal reach of RFRA in place. It is peculiar that the Court did
not even drop a footnote to explain whether or not the majority meant to imply anything about
the issue. See Michael McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne
v. Flores, 111 HARv. L. REv. 153 (1997).
" "The first constitutional problem encountered by Reconstruction had been the need to
give the national government as a whole powers which had been exercised by the States; the
second was to assert the right of the legislative branch within the national government."
BROCK, supra note 57, at 254.
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religious interests of various sects and their adherents will frequently intersect,
conflict, and combine. 'T
Through emphasizing the importance of social context, O'Connor has
developed an approach that would "preclude government from conveying or
attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is
favored or preferred. 79  In part, this approach incorporates an important
recognition of what effects apparent state endorsement may have on those who
are dissenters, skeptics, or simply losers in the many political battles
interlarded with religious issues."
For Justice Scalia, by contrast, there should be little - if any - judicial
second-guessing of how matters affecting religion are resolved by state or
local authorities. Scalia may believe that the opposite is true regarding the
judgments of elected federal officials. According to Scalia, the issue is "quite
simply, whether the people, through their elected representatives, or rather this
Court, shall control the outcome of these concrete cases."8' With vigor, Scalia
asserts that Smith already has answered: "[i]t shall be the people." 2
There is no template, of course, to fit over the multitude of complex disputes
about federalism, particularly when they are commingled with sorting out
basic Religion Clause tensions in the "crucible of litigation." This is the case
even if one were still to agree that "the Court has unambiguously concluded
that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment
embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all." 3 But the
question of whether anyone will comprehend and fully protect the rights of
minority religions, fringe beliefs, and doubters has become much more
pressing after Smith and Boerne.
In earlier cases, it often seemed possible to map the votes of the Justices by
concentrating on whose perspective in the litigation they adopted or found
78 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'9 Id. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor argued that courts are obliged to
examine whether "government's purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually
conveys a message of endorsement." Id. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The bitter debate
within the Court about both the purpose and the effect of Alabama's moment of silence and
voluntary prayer statutes, however, suggests how difficult the role of "objective observer" may
be in the context of the coexistence and conflict of secular and religious interests at the state
level. See id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
80 Prayer in the schools caused heated controversy in the nineteenth century as well. See,
e.g., DONALD E. BOLEs, THE BmLE, REUGION, AND THE PUBUC SCHOOLS (1965); Charles
Fairman, The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise: History of the Supreme Court of the United
States, in 6 RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-1888 1310-16 (1971); CHARLES MORRIS,
AMERICAN CATHOtiC (1997); cf. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 997 (1998) (upholding Milwaukee tuition voucher plan).
81 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 544 (Scalia, J., with Stevens, J., concurring in part).
82 Id. (Scalia, J., with Stevens, J., concurring in part).
83 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 53 (1985) (Stevens, J., for the majority).
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worthy of empathy. Justice Stevens for the majority in Wallace v. Jaffree, for
example, expressed concern for the views of nonbelievers and those who feel
silently coerced, while Justice O'Connor was drawn to the role of "objective
observer." On the other hand, Chief Justice Burger wholeheartedly identified
with the Alabama authorities and embraced their argument that the statute
under review "affirmatively furthers the values of religious freedom and
tolerance that the Establishment Clause was designed to protect," while his
fellow dissenter, Justice Rehnquist, argued primarily from a critical history of
the "wall of separation" metaphor that he took to be obvious to "any detached
observer."'
The significance of perspective is particularly acute in the context of legal
scrutiny of religious matters. Chief Justice Burger may have been blustering
a bit, but he had a point. A position of neutrality concerning religion is indeed
hard to establish and hard to maintain both legally and personally. 5 We all
make our own arrangements regarding religion, volitional or not.86 Moreover,
because religious issues are exceptionally sensitive, multilayered, and elusive
to outside observers, the paradigmatic judicial role of objectivity and/or
detachment becomes particularly difficult to identify or to maintain."
Perhaps because issues of law and religion are so complicated, and so
personally charged, the current Court seeks to establish some lower common
denominators. Boerne makes it clear that a majority of the Justices believe
that formal voting equality within state and local political processes affords
- Id. at 53-54, 76, 83, 89, 92. Thus, for Justice O'Connor, "[tihe solution to the conflict
between Religion Clauses lies not in 'neutrality,' but rather in identifying workable limits to the
government's license to promote the free exercise of religion." Id. at 83 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Whereas, for Chief Justice Burger:
[i]f the government may not accommodate religious needs when it does so in a wholly
neutral and noncoercive manner, the 'benevolent neutrality' that we have long considered
the correct constitutional standard will quickly translate into the 'callous indifference'
that the Court has consistently held the Establishment Clause does not require.
Id. at 90 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Powell concurred separately, primarily to urge
retention of the Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), test, and Justice White dissented
separately, primarily to repeat his call for basic reconsideration of the Court's precedents
dealing with the Religion Clauses.
85 See Laycock, supra note 2.
86 See Williams & Williams, supra note 2.
87 Shortly before he was murdered, along with five other Jesuits and their housekeeper and
her daughter in El Salvador in 1989, Father Ignacio Martfn-Bar6 explained:
Objectivity is not the same as impartiality with regard to the processes that necessarily
affect all of us. Thus, for an objective psychosocial analysis it is more useful to become
conscious of one's own involvements and interests than to deny them and try to place
oneself on a fictitious higher plane "beyond good and evil."
Religion as an Instrument of Psychological Warfare, in Ignacio Martfn-Bar6, WRITINGS FOR A
LIBERATION PSYCHOLOGY 149-50 (Adrianne Aron & Shawn Come eds., 1994). See also
SOIFER, supra note 51, at 150-8 1.
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sufficient protection for free consciences. If, but only if, the popular will is so
blatantly biased as to adopt a "religious gerrymander 88 - as the City of
Hialeah was held to have done in Lukumi - will the Court allow federal
judicial intervention. Absent overt gerrymandering based on religion, state
politics as usual must prevail. In the name of deference to the proper authority
of the states, therefore, there ought to be no special constitutional solicitude,
no particular concern to shield dissenters, and no obligation to protect the
politically vulnerable from "intolerance of the disbeliever and the uncertain." 's
There seems great haste to get the job done, to have at last "paved paradise &
put up a parking lot."
C. "The Essential Autonomy of Religious Life"91
By contrast to the ebb and flow of the jurisdictional aspects of federalism,
the autonomy of religious bodies in ecclesiastical matters has been well
established as a federal matter for over a century. Faced with one of the
multitude of disputes that arose in the era of the Civil War over who controlled
a particular church, the United States Supreme Court held as early as 1871
that:
whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom,
or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the
matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final,
and binding on them, in their application to the case before them.92
" Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535 (1993)
(discussed supra note 6).
'9 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 54.
0 Joni Mitchell, Big Yellow Taxi, in RISE UP SINGING (Peter Blood & Annie Patterson eds.,
1992).
9' Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 796 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 726 (1871) (rejecting implied trust judicial review and
instead deferring to General Assembly of Presbyterian Church that had awarded Walnut Street
Church in Louisville, Kentucky to antislavery faction). The Watson decision was not based on
constitutional law, but rather was within the Court's common law review power at the time.
Watson was followed and transformed into a federal constitutional rule in subsequent decisions.
See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese of Am. & Canada
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952). State courts had established the principle of deference
to ecclesiastical jurisdiction earlier, though not without great struggles, for example, as they
faced bitter disputes over church control and property between Congregationalists and
Unitarians. This extended controversy helped induce the gradual disestablishment of religion
under state law, a movement that had reached even Massachusetts by 1833. See, e.g., The
Unitarian Controversy, in LEONARD LEvY, THE LAw OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF
JUSTICE SHAW 29-42 (1957).
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In Watson v. Jones, the Court recognized the far-reaching importance and
practical impact of conceding such exclusive and final authority to church
bodies. Indeed, Justice Miller, writing for the majority, somewhat wistfully
noted that the dispute involved a jurisdictional issue, but he then added,
"[t]here is, perhaps, no word in legal terminology so frequently used as the
word jurisdiction, so capable of use in a general and vague sense, and which
is used so often by men learned in the law without a due regard to precision in
its application., 93 Nonetheless, the Court held that deference to religious
authority was inescapable because "[i]n this country thefull and free right to
entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach
any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and
property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all."'
The Watson Court's statement of broad deference to the jurisdiction of
religious groups was fenced round with caveats, to be sure, ranging from the
limits anchored in what judges might discern as problems of morality,
property, and personal rights to the Court's proclaimed ultimate judicial
control over what constitutes an ecclesiastical matter, properly understood.95
It is in the nature of jurisdictional disputes, in fact, to be partly about power,
partly about relative autonomy - but nearly always about the interpretation of
authority on a continuum. This problem of overlapping jurisdictions seems to
frustrate the Court today, particularly as a majority seems to be committed to
the discovery of settled and easily discerned either/or principles.
The current Court's discomfort with the jurisdictional tension at the heart
of the Religion Clauses has led a majority to stir free exercise claims into a
pabulum of unexamined general, neutral rules. Such discomfort also may help
explain why the Justices appear so inclined to castigate those who litigate at
the crossroads of law and religion. Paradoxically, some of the same Justices
who declare themselves anxious to reduce what they take to be the excessive
separation of church and state, simultaneously reject free exercise arguments
by maintaining that these religious claims conflict with the special needs of the
military, for example, or the strictly internal affairs of the social security
bureaucracy."
9' Watson, 80 U.S. at 732.
' Id. at 728 (emphasis added).
9- All these possible limits, in fact, help explain how the "elementary dear Watson"
principle has found an apparently secure home in American jurisprudence.
' See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,507 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.) (proclaiming
great deference to the military's professional judgment regarding military interest "within
military community"); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 712 (1986) (Burger., C.J.) (emphasizing
need to leave "sufficient operating latitude" to government entities).
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Nancy Rosenblum has pointed out substantial dangers looming within the
potential imperialism of "sacred space."'9 On the other hand, secular authority
has a strong "jurispathic" tendency, as Robert Cover explained, which
continuously challenges our nation's "breathtaking acknowledgment of the
privilege of insular autonomy for all sorts of groups and associations."9
Jurisdictional tension enlivens some of the best recent scholarship about
groups, particularly the developing focus on the remarkedly diverse capacity
to create meaning. Such creativity often is accomplished by individuals and
groups who operate largely in realms quite apart from the state.99
V. CONCLUSION: ALTERNATIVE HISTORIES
The core problem in the constitutional jurisprudence of law and religion
may be that in the United States there is not now, nor has there ever been, a
clear way to identify or to cabin the essential autonomy of religious life. It is
uncommonly easy in the realm of religion, in fact, to identify exceptions and
limitations. Thus there is a tendency to argue from extreme examples of one
slippery slope or another."° Perhaps for this very reason, it would be wise to
heed the nuances of historical context, rather than to seek a simple originalist
key to unlock some purported Framers' intent.
It should matter, for example, that Roger Williams believed strongly that
"[t]he Christian magistrate could best advance the cause of his own religion by
doing it no favors."'' But we should also be aware that for all his
pathbreaking commitment to tolerance, Williams saw nothing wrong in
disarming Catholics and making them wear distinctive clothes or in
suppressing the "incivilities" of the Quakers, whom he detested - though he
would not allow suppressing their modes of worship."° Moreover, it is fitting
that we attend to the kinetic quality of the relationship of law and religion
9 ROSENBLUM, supra note 2, at 93 (discussing Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) as a prime example).
9 Robert Cover, Supreme Court, 1982 Term- Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 60-62 (1983).
9 See, e.g., ROSENBLUM, supra note 2; EVANS, supra note 2.
"0 A good example may be found in Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990): "Any society
adopting such a system would be courting anarchy, but the danger increases in direct proportion
to the society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none
of them." Id. at 888. Professor Lupu points out, however: "Behind every free exercise claim
is a spectral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will be confronted
with an endless chain of exemption demands from religious deviants of every stripe." Lupu,
supra note 2, at 947.
'o' MORGAN, supra note 22, at 140.
'o See id. at 134.
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across time, to say nothing of the current dramatic flux in religious identities
within our nation.
Arguments from history do not compel outcomes. In fact, it often is
striking how the same decision-makers can feel comfortable in gliding back
and forth between levels of generality and the kinds of history they find
compelling. For example, in the span of five years, the Supreme Court held
both that it was unconstitutional for Tennessee to exclude ministers from
holding public office and that it was constitutional for Nebraska's unicameral
legislature to begin each session with a prayer in the Judeo-Christian tradition
offered for sixteen straight years by a Presbyterian chaplain paid by the state.
In both cases, Chief Justice Burger wrote the lead opinions, and he relied in
both on America's historical experience. That experience, according to
Burger, meant that Tennessee's position as the lone state to retain the once
commonplace prohibition against ministers' service had to give way to a new
tide and the lessons of time."°3 In the Nebraska decision, by contrast, Burger
argued that it was crucial to recognize that: "[t]he opening of sessions of
legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded
in the history and tradition of this country."'" In an important sense, the use
of history in these two decisions underscores the Court's tendency to embrace
"winners' history" as if it were definitive.
What this approach misses, however, is the need for judges to hear and to
understand the perspective of skeptics and dissenters who invoke the courts'
jurisdiction as they seek to resist the majoritarian flood. From at least the time
of Roger Williams, the history we celebrate has included refuge for those
unable or unwilling to go along with the majority because of beliefs and
practices anchored in their religious views, or even their lack of religious
beliefs altogether.
We aspire to treat like cases alike. Simultaneously, however, Americans
like to emphasize that every person is different from every other person. This
helps to explain why the protection of full rights of conscience so often seems
to be in direct tension with the protection of equal rights. To treat everyone
the same is to miss critical contextual differences. These differences tend to
matter a great deal when religion and freedom of conscience are directly at
issue.
Despite the current Court's considerable enthusiasm to settle these difficult
matters by flattening them into general rules or by stuffing them into
103 See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 625 (1978). The Court was unanimous (Justice
Blackmun did not participate), but for very different doctrinal reasons. Writing for the plurality,
Burger relied on historical change over time rather than being bound by Framers' intent and the
fact that a majority of the states had prohibitions parallel to Tennessee's at the time of the
Constitution and throughout most of the nation's early history.
1o4 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
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jurisdictional cubbyholes, one may take comfort from the very complexity and
resilience of the matters in dispute. Chief Justice Rehnquist was correct when
he paraphrased Mark DeWolfe Howe and insisted that "stare decisis may bind
courts as to matters of law, but it cannot bind them as to matters of history."' 5
Fortunately - one might even say blessedly - our history seems to include
enhanced general acceptance of a core belief that: "[o]ne' s right to life, liberty,
and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly,
and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections."'" Such rights still must be taken largely on faith
and attended to outside the courtroom. But they remain key elements of an
ongoing quest to make real a broad promise that: "[i]f there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.'""°
We have hardly begun to see the light about what might strike us as
unorthodox. Though the force behind those who dare to differ may emanate
from somewhere deep within our past, we have yet to guarantee the "full and
equal rights of conscience.
' 1°8
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
106 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (invalidating
mandatory stiff-arm flag salute in public schools).
"o Id. at 642. Even if there are no fixed stars - and despite the fact that the starlight we see
is from very long ago - there is still something worth maintaining in the pursuit of lofty goals.
This should include seeking to secure constitutional protection for dissenters, even those bold
enough to exercise freedom of conscience and religion "fully and freely," at least until they
"manifestly endanger" clearly competing and very substantial governmental interests.
" James Madison's proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution in the First Congress in
1789, quoted and discussed supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
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